Do You Remember

Refreshing Your Recollection

of Past Judicial Decisions

Ralph B. Strickland, Jr.
Agency Legal Specialist
North Carolina Justice Academy

Volume 2 Number 1
December 1994

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 83 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

When a motor home is a vehicle for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

In May of 1979 a DEA agent saw Charles Carney approach a juvenile male in San Diego, California. They entered Mr. Carney's Dodge mini motor home parked in a nearby lot. They closed all of the window shades including one across the front window. The DEA agent had been told that the same motor home was being used by another adult who was exchanging marijuana for sex.

With the patience known only to law enforcement officers on surveillance, the agent and others waited over an hour. The youth left the motor home, was stopped, and told the agents that he received marijuana in return for "allowing Carney sexual contacts."

The juvenile accompanied the agents to the motor home. They knocked on the door and Carney stepped out into his worst nightmare. The agents identified themselves, and without a warrant or consent, entered the motor home and conducted a search revealing marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale used for weighing drugs. The motor home was taken to a local police station, and once again without consent or a warrant, was searched a second time. This search revealed more marijuana.

In the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effect a routine felony arrest or to conduct a search violates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). On the other hand, an officer who has probable cause to believe an item subject to seizure is in a motor vehicle on a public street or highway, or public vehicular area, may seize the vehicle and search it with a warrant or consent. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); State v. Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 356 S.E.2d 573 (1987). So - if the courts consider the mini motor home a residence as it sat in that lot, the officers violated Charles Carney's constitutional rights by their entry and search. If, though, it is a motor vehicle as it sat there (and was just being used as a place for illegal sexual trysts) then the officers' actions were constitutional and Carney's goose is cooked.

Well, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the defendant's goose was, in fact, cooked. The Court ruled that as the Carney vehicle was being used it was more of a vehicle than a residence. As previously noted, one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a motor vehicle. The Constitution affords a lesser degree of protection for a vehicle than a residence, because of the vehicle's ready mobility and because "the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office."

So, why was this a vehicle in the lot in San Diego and not a residence? Well, it was readily mobile by the turning of an ignition key, and it was "stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes - temporary or otherwise...". Also, it was a "licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulations inapplicable to a fixed dwelling."

Well, what can we draw from this to enable you to make a decision about warrantless searches of motor homes?

1. When a vehicle is being used on the highways, it is to be considered a motor vehicle and not a motor home.

2. If it is readily capable of being used on the highway but is now stationary (temporary or not) in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, and is not being used as a residence, it is to be considered a motor vehicle and not a motor home.

3. If the vehicle is currently licensed for use as a motor vehicle on the highways, then that is one factor to be considered in your determination. It is more likely a motor vehicle if licensed; more likely a residence if not (and elevated on blocks, wrecked, etc.).

4. If it is connected to utilities (externally connected to water or power or sewage lines) it is probably a residence and not a motor vehicle (while so connected).

5. If the motor home is parked on the curtilage of a residence (the area immediately surrounding the home that is so intimately tied to it that it is accorded Fourth Amendment protection) it may not be searched without a warrant or consent.

An interesting additional point: the agents took Carney's motor home to a police station and there made a warrantless, nonconsensual search. How were they able to move the vehicle from the point of the initial seizure and still make a valid search? In 1970, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) and upheld a similar search "...by extending Carroll: if there is probable cause to search a vehicle when it is stopped on a highway, officers may made a warrantless search on the highway or take the car to the police station and conduct a warrantless search there." Farb, Arrest, Search, Investigation in North Carolina, Institute of Government, 1992, p. 321. I just thought you might like to know.

Finally, remember: If you are not certain if you need a search warrant, get one. It's the safest course of action.


If you have any questions, please contact me or the other attorneys here at the Academy at (910) 525-4151.