Ralph B. Strickland, Jr.
Agency Legal Specialist
North Carolina Justice Academy

Volume 1 Number 7
August 1994

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

Search incident to arrest everywhere but in the passenger area of an automobile.

In Volume 1, Number 6, I discussed the case of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), which established the "bright line" (very clear) rules for a search incident to arrest in the passenger area of an automobile. Today, we look at the rules of search incident to arrest everywhere but the passenger area of an automobile. The case establishing the general rule for such incident to arrest is Chimel.

Late in the afternoon of September 13, 1965, police officers arrived at Ted Chimel's house with an arrest warrant charging him with burglary. Mrs. Chimel allowed entry into the home, and all awaited the return of Mr. Chimel. When Ted entered the house he was placed under arrest, and the officers asked him if they could look around. He objected, but the officers decided to search the house based on his arrest. They searched the three-bedroom house with Mrs. Chimel's assistance (but without her consent) and recovered numerous items taken during the burglary. Ted was convicted in the California trial court on the basis of the introduction at trial into evidence those items seized at his home. The case finally found its way to the United States Supreme Court where the conviction was reversed: the officers did not conduct a valid search incident to the arrest of Ted Chimel.

In its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that as early as 1914 it had authorized the warrantless search of a person based upon his lawful arrest. In 1925, it extended this search to items under the control of the arrestee. A few months after that, the Court further extended the search to the site where the arrest took place. The problem, since 1925, was the federal appellate courts' interpretation of the search incident to arrest rule. The scope of that rule waxed and waned (grew and shrunk) as the pendulum of rights of the police versus the accused citizen swung from side to side through Supreme Court decisions.

So, the Court made a decision to firmly establish the authority of police searches in these arrest situations by stating:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control" -- construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

Certainly, this paragraph is one with which each law enforcement officer should be intimately acquainted. It is always in your best interests to be able to quote the United Stated Supreme Court, on your lawful authority to act as a law enforcement officer, to suspects, counsel, or the court.

Interestingly enough, the North Carolina appellate courts have, with one exception, adopted the Chimel rule on search incident to arrest. As Bob Farb states in his excellent text Arrest, Search and Investigation in North Carolina, Second Edition 1992:

...the North Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled (contrary to prevailing federal case law) that officers do not have the authority to search incident to arrest a large, locked suitcase that a person is carrying when arrested. Thus, at least as to such a suitcase, officers must obtain a search warrant to search it - assuming there is probable cause to search.

The case is State v. Thomas, 81 N.C.App. 200, 343 S.E.2d 588, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 287, 347 S.E.2d 469 (1986). It clearly limits your authority during a search incident to arrest anywhere but in an automobile (where it simply does not apply).

So, what should be your course of action in these situations? Well, if you arrest a person anywhere but in or near the passenger compartment of an automobile:

1. You may search that person for weapons and evidence of crime a crime (automatically and with only probable cause to arrest; probable cause to search is not required).

2. You may then handcuff your prisoner, and prior to moving him from the location of the arrest, you may search the area under the "immediate control" of the arrestee: his lunge area. This "lunge" area will be determined on a case-by-case basis and younger, more agile and fleet of foot arrestees will have a greater lunge area than older, less agile arrestees. When you search the lunge area you will be searching for weapons and evidence. In Mr. Chimel's case, had the officer only searched the lunge area of Mr. Chimel (instead of his whole house) there would have been no illegal search problem.

3. During the search of the area and objects under the immediate control of your arrestee you may search all open and closed containers in that area. But you may not open a locked container WITHOUT CONSENT, A REAL EMERGENCY, OR A SEARCH WARRANT (State v. Thomas).

Remember: the rules for search incident to arrest of a passenger area are slightly but seriously different from such a search anywhere else. This bulletin should be read in conjunction with Volume 1 Number 6 for a complete discussion of all issues.

If you have any questions, call me or the other attorneys here at the Justice Academy at (910) 525-4151.